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Abstract
This paper discusses a model where consumers differ according to one unobservable (preference for quality) and one observable
characteristic (location), with nonlinear prices arising in equilibrium. The main question addressed is whether firms should be
allowed to practice different nonlinear prices at each location (delivered nonlinear pricing) or should be forced to set a unique
nonlinear contract (mill nonlinear pricing). Assuming that firms can costless relocate, we show that the free entry long-run number
of firms may be smaller, equal, or higher under delivered nonlinear pricing. Moreover, delivered nonlinear pricing yields higher
long-run welfare when (i) fixed costs are low and when (ii) fixed costs are intermediate and consumer types are not very similar.
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1. Introduction
Regulation theory has been one of the most active
areas of research in the last decade. However, regulation
of firms' pricing policies has been almost neglected
within this wave of research. This paper revisits the
issue of whether regulatory authorities should prohibit
firms from practicing price discrimination among
consumers who differ according to some observable
characteristic.
The currently accepted view that unregulated markets
are more competitive has been justified by economic
theory using spatial pricing models. Most of existing
studies compare spatial discriminatory pricing with non-
discriminatory mill pricing1 for a given market structure
(see, for example, Norman, 1983; Thisse and Vives,
1988). Under spatial discriminatory pricing firms can
price discriminate across locations, hence firms compete
in each of them.On the other hand if firms have to practice
the same price in every location, competition occurs only
at the boundary of each firm's market. As a consequence,
for a givenmarket structure discriminatory pricing ismore
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1 Implicit in this comparison is the idea that without pricing
regulation firms will practice discriminatory prices. Thisse and Vives
(1988) have shown that if firms are free to choose their pricing policy,
in equilibrium, they will in fact price discriminate even though this
implies lower profits for all firms.
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